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FLORENCE KELLEY AND THE BATTLE AGAINST LAISSEZ-FAIRE
CONSTITUTIONALISM1
Felice Batlan
We all know the story of the demise of substantive due process in the
1930s and our story usually features heroes such as Louis Brandeis and Felix
Frankfurter and the great male legal progressives of the day who rose up from
academia, the bench, and the bar, to put an end to what historians label “legal
orthodoxy.” In this essay, I seek to demonstrate that Florence Kelley was a
crucially important legal progressive who was at the front lines of drafting and
defending new legislation that courts were striking down as violating the
Fourteenth Amendment and state constitutions. Looking at who was drafting and
lobbying for path breaking progressive legislation and how such legislation was
being defended accomplishes a number of things. It uncovers how male legal
actors at times worked closely and collaborated with women reformers.
Furthermore, thinking about women reformers as central legal actors demands
that we examine our own categorical thinking. Placing progressive era women
reformers in a non-porous women’s sphere, while imagining that elite male legal
thinkers were sealed within an all-male world of academics, lawyers and jurists,
distorts late nineteenth and early twentieth century legal culture and leads to what
we might call “intellectual segregation.”2 This essay is thus a work of bricolage
that brings together the scholarship on women’s leading roles in progressive era
reform with mainstream narratives of legal history.
Situating Florence Kelley as a legal reformer further allows us to explore
some of the significant differences between how men and women legal reformers
approached the law. In part, male legal thinkers deeply struggled with questions
involving legal rights, the common law, the role of judges, the redistribution of
wealth, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the growth of an administrative state.
Many women reformers did not have similar struggles and qualms. These women
legal reformers had come to realize that custom, the common law, and courts had
consistently thwarted women’s rights. Courts had failed to grant women the right
to vote, found that the Fourteenth Amendment did not protect women from
discrimination, and often negated the Married Women’s Property Acts. By the
turn of the century, elite women reformers had few illusions about courts, the
common law, the Constitution, and legal custom. Where men like Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. posited that custom and the common law served as a buffer between
1
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the state and the individual, many women legal reformers understood that custom
and the common law blocked women’s struggles for rights and more generally
for social reform.3 Having a stake in the system, many progressive male legal
thinkers reached such critical assessments regarding courts, the Constitution, and
the common law more slowly. In contrast, Florence Kelley radically reinterpreted
the Constitution as placing affirmative duties on the state. These duties required
the state to provide for those material conditions which would foster true
democracy. This radical vision, which Kelley had already set forth by 1905, is
exceedingly modern and it defined the ways in which she would defend
legislation from Constitutional challenge and marry the philosophy of
pragmatism, social science, on the ground reality, and law.
Kelley was born into an elite Pennsylvania family that had deep roots in
various reform movements. Her father was a lawyer, judge, and long-time
congressman, and her great-aunt was a Quaker abolitionist involved in women’s
rights struggles. Like Elizabeth Cady Stanton, who learned law from her attorney
father, Kelley was immersed in law and political change from a young age. At
Cornell College in the late 1870s, Kelley founded the Social Science Club. While
spending a year with her father in Washington D.C., Kelley wrote her senior
thesis, entitled “On Some Changes in the Legal Status of the Child since
Blackstone.” In the thesis, Kelley used traditional legal sources, statutes, and
statistical data on children. From this very early period, Kelley was already
attempting to combine law and empirical evidence.4
Having graduated from Cornell and unable to pursue an advanced degree
in the United States because she was a woman, Kelley enrolled at Zurich
University, where she spent three years studying government. During this period,
she became immersed in socialism and was the first person to translate into
English Friedrich Engels’s The Condition of the Working Class in England. She
also began a long-term personal acquaintance with Engels. Upon her return to the
United States, Kelley worked on legislation in New York and Philadelphia that
sought to limit working hours for women and minors. By 1891, Kelley had
already authored twenty-five articles, which had appeared in national and
international publications primarily focusing on labor questions.5 Kelley certainly
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understood herself as an intellectual, socialist, and reformer with a keen interest
in using law to better the conditions of labor.
After the dissolution of her marriage, Kelley arrived at Jane Addams’s
Hull House in Chicago, where Julia Lathrop, one of the few women members of
the Illinois bar, was already a resident. Although Kelley envisioned becoming a
university professor and hoped that Richard Ely would aid her in obtaining such
a position at the University of Wisconsin, he was no help.6 Ely’s rebuff was not
surprising, given that the doors of the academy (with the exception of women’s
colleges) were essentially closed to women. Thus Kelley immersed herself in
Hull House, seeking to combine her legal and theoretical knowledge with
firsthand experience regarding workers’ lives. Describing her Hull House
experience, Kelley wrote to Engels, “I am . . . learning more in a week of actual
conditions of proletarian life in America than in any previous year.”7
In multiple ways, Hull House participated in creating the new practice of
social science and marrying it with the emerging philosophy of pragmatism. At
the center of Jane Addams and Hull House’s philosophy and methodology stood
this rejection of certainty and the embrace of material, on-the-ground study, and
action. As pragmatist philosopher George Mead remarked, “The settlement
embodied the ideal of an engaged ‘social’ science guided by ‘working
hypotheses’—provisional rather than absolute or dogmatic knowledge.”8 Addams
called for settlement houses to be sites of experimentation that would continually
adjust their methods and goals as conditions required.9 One of the important
contributions of settlement houses was their often path breaking social science
research. As Addams wrote, “We were the actual pioneers in field research.”10
Josephine Goldmark further remarked that “The settlements antedated by ten
years the establishment of the first foundation for social research.”11
Addams and Hull House also participated in the development and lived
experience of pragmatism. John Dewey was extraordinarily close to Addams and
deeply involved in Hull House. He also readily acknowledged the settlement’s
influence on his thoughts and actions.12 Furthermore Hull House was a center of
intellectual life through which the leading intellectuals and reformers of the day
passed, including Ernst Freund and Roscoe Pound. When Pound was teaching in
6
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Chicago (1907–10), the very period during which he called for a sociological
jurisprudence, his former student Edith Abbott, then a resident at Hull House,
introduced Pound to Jane Addams and Hull House. It is here that Pound became
interested in social work.13
Kelley was immersed in this environment. It provided an exceptional
space from which she could develop and combine her interest in law, political
economy, and fieldwork. With Addams’s help, Kelley obtained a position with
the Bureau of Labor Statistics of Illinois, where she primarily concentrated on
women’s factory work and an anti-sweating campaign. This work lead Caroll
Wright, head of the U.S. Census Bureau, to hire Kelley to lead the Chicago
portion of a federal study on urban slums. Kelley thus began the process of
canvassing Chicago’s neighborhoods, eliciting responses to questions that in part
surveyed respondents for nationality, conditions of labor, wages, and health.
Where Wright used such information to produce The Slums of Baltimore,
Chicago, New York and Philadelphia, Kelley and other Hull House residents
created the groundbreaking Hull House maps. As Kelley’s biographer writes,
“By defining spatial relationships among human groups, they vividly depicted
social and economic relationships.”14 Urban space, ethnicity, race, health,
housing, and their relationship to poverty were denaturalized and contextualized.
During this part of Kelley’s career, she was functioning as a social scientist,
collecting and analyzing facts, while showing their relationship to poverty and
the conditions of labor. The maps, along with essays by Kelley, Addams, and
other settlement house residents, would appear in Richard Ely’s series Library of
Economics and Politics.
Other work that Kelley accomplished consisted of examining the
working conditions of 5,099 women. Data collected from such women and
employers included pay, length of working days, periods of unemployment,
nationality, information on home life, expense budgets, and family background.
This study dramatically demonstrated that working women often supported
themselves and their families and sought to vividly show the necessity of women
receiving living wages.15 Kelley subsequently conducted a study on the
conditions of sweatshops in which women worked. Her 1892 report found that
women worked from ten hours to sixteen hours a day at extremely low wages and
often in horrendous conditions. The report recommended groundbreaking
legislation that would require the licensing of manufacturers, the prohibition of
garment manufacturing in tenements, the regulation of child labor, maximumhours laws, and regular inspections. Kelley, along with others, then drafted a
legislative bill that provided for maximum hours for women workers and a ban
13
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on child labor. It also proposed the creation of an office of Illinois factory
inspector.
Kelley understood well that such labor legislation was redistributive as
well as groundbreaking. Her focus on women and children was a strategic and
realistic appraisal of what the public and legal precedent would support. As
Kelley reasoned, the public was much more likely to support legislation
involving women and children, whom the public understood as helpless, than
men, whom the public construed as being able to care for themselves.
Furthermore, she was keenly aware that the common law traditionally construed
women’s contracts rights narrowly, as evidenced by coverture. Finally, Kelley
firmly believed that the reduction of women’s hours would have the material
effect of reducing men’s hours as well. Importantly, from this early date, Kelley
tied together law on the books with law in action. As she wrote, “Mere
enactments are idle in the face of a menace like this. The delinquent must be
confronted not only with the law on the statute book but the law-officer at his
door.”16 She and other legal progressives would spend the next forty years
fighting for and defending protective workers legislation. Kelley’s work in 1892
essentially set forth the manner in which she would operate for close to forty
years—investigate, draft laws, lobby for such laws, and work on developing a
regulatory state that would enforce such laws. It is difficult not to see that Kelley
provided much of the groundwork for what Pound would much later call
sociological jurisprudence.
Kelley’s successful work, along with the influence of Addams, led the
Illinois governor to appoint Kelley to the newly created post of Illinois factory
inspector. At approximately this time, Kelley enrolled in and quickly graduated
from Northwestern Law School. As chief factory inspector, Kelley had the
principal responsibility for enforcement of the law that she had drafted. Kelley’s
office quickly began prosecuting manufacturers, and at one point Kelley boasted
that her office was averaging one indictment per day.17 Thus by 1893, Kelley was
fully functioning as an attorney at the forefront of interpreting, enforcing, and
expanding new state regulatory powers. Simultaneously, Kelley and her staff
engaged in significant investigation, collecting and interpreting empirical
evidence on the conditions of labor, including child labor, workplace injuries,
and the importance of the eight-hour work day. Kelley’s methodology continued
to combine what was now even more detailed statistical work with law. For
example, Kelley wrote, “It is my ambition to make the most thoroughly
specialized study of statistics of child labor that has ever been made.”18 Such
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information was then used to both educate the public and create an agenda for
future legislation.
In 1894, Kelley warned manufacturers that her office would begin
prosecuting employers who employed women for over eight hours a day. As she
began such prosecutions, she confronted the newly formed Illinois
Manufacturing Protective Association, which was created to challenge the
constitutionality of the Illinois maximum-hours law for women. A prosecution of
nine manufacturers brought by Kelley’s office resulted in the courts confronting
the constitutional issue of whether the law violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
Kelley, along with two others, wrote the state’s brief. The brief is quite
remarkable for its compendium on the multiple ways in which the state already
regulated industry and individuals pursuant to the police power. Indeed it seemed
to be saying that state action was everywhere. The brief further claimed that
“Labor in factories of more than eight hours a day deprives the average woman . .
. of their health . . . so that in the end they are deprived of labor by a long day;
and obtain more labor, and the results of labor, by a short day.”19 Pursuant to this
argument, worthy of the best legal realist, only state action could produce actual
freedom of contract.
The brief also cited a wide variety of experts regarding the health effects
of long hours on women. For example, it quoted the Massachusetts Bureau of
Labor, the U.S. Commissioners of Labor, a report to the British Board of Local
Government, and a report to the Royal Commission on Labour of England. As
the brief argued, such authorities agreed that workers’ nerves and health were
damaged “by the constant tension of factory work, the machine-like method of
toil, and the accompanying tremendous strain on the female system.”20 This, of
course, would become one of the main arguments used fourteen years later in the
Muller brief. Even more importantly, the Ritchie brief was already experimenting
with the use of medical and sociological data.
As we are well aware, in Ritchie v. Illinois (1895), the Illinois Supreme
Court unanimously struck down the eight-hour law for women as a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision did not, however, strike down the
prohibition against child labor. Kelley criticized the court as follows:
The judicial mind has not kept pace with the strides of industrial
development in Illinois, and in this decision the Supreme Court shows
that Illinois is in law to-day what it was in fact when the Constitution
was adopted in 1870—an agricultural State. . . . It may be that the
Court is as advanced as that part of the community which is not yet
thoroughly aware that Illinois is now one of the great manufacturing
States. When the observation of a few more years has convinced the
19
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medical profession, the philanthropists, and the educators as experience
has already convinced factory employees themselves, that it is a life
and death matter . . . to have a working day of reasonable length
guaranteed by law, it will be found possible to rescue the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States from the perverted
application upon which this decision rests.21

The judgment that courts were significantly out of touch with reality would
become one of the constant complaints made by legal progressives following
Lochner, ten years later. Here Kelley not only fully articulated the problem of
courts adherence to abstract principles that did not conform to on-the-ground
facts but also understood that it was the duty of experts from a wide variety of
disciplines to educate courts.
In 1899, Kelley accepted a position as head of the newly created
National Consumers League (NCL) in New York. Through her work with the
NCL, she came into close contact with a slew of male legal reformers,
economists, and progressives, including John Graham Brooks, Richard Ely,
E. R. A. Seligman, Louis Brandeis, Felix Frankfurter, and Benjamin Cohen, just
to name a few. Although in its early years the NCL concentrated on influencing
the purchasing habits of consumers, Kelley soon expanded its work to focus
primarily on legal reform, lobbying, and defending protective legislation for
workers against constitutional challenges. Kelley and her female employees,
including Josephine Goldmark, drafted model bills regarding maximum hours,
prohibitions on night work for women, and child labor laws. Kelley played a
leading role in selecting the cases in which the NCL would become involved and
negotiated with states to allow the NCL to intervene in court proceedings. She
also “planned and oversaw the development of the legal briefs drafted by her
female assistants at the NCL and recruited prominent male attorneys to serve as
legal figureheads in these cases.”22

While at the NCL, Kelley published her first full-length book,
Some Ethical Gains through Legislation (1905). In it, she argued that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit protective legislation for workers.
Instead of freedom of contract, Kelley framed the work around a
constellation of rights including the right to childhood, the right to leisure,
and the rights of purchasers. In contrast to the laissez-faire state, Kelley
advocated an activist state that pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment had
affirmative duties to its citizens. For Kelley, rights arose from the needs of
21
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a democratic society, and it was the state’s obligation to foster the health
and well-being of its citizens. Thus a right to childhood existed so that
children could attend school and become productive citizens. Such a right
required the state to prohibit child labor and institute compulsory
education. A right to leisure allowed workers to rest and “undo the
damage wrought in the working-hours, so that the worker could remain fit
for citizenship in the Republic.”23 Furthermore, leisure promoted the
preservation of health, which was necessary for the overall well-being of
society. As Kelley wrote, “To be deprived of leisure is to be deprived of
those things worth living.”24 Individual rights, for Kelley, were tied to
what she called social rights—those rights of the entire society—for
society could not flourish if individuals did not flourish. One way in which
Kelley demonstrated the interconnectedness of individuals and the larger
society was by uniting production and consumption. Without the worker
having a right to leisure, health, and decent working conditions, the
consumer never could be sure of the origin or cleanliness of commodities
that she purchased. The ill worker, exhausted and sick from overwork in
unsanitary conditions, would spread germs to the consumer in the goods
that she made. As Kelley wrote, “Before the individual purchaser can
vindicate his own personal rights, the whole body of purchasers are
constrained to save childhood for the children, and home life for the
workers.”25
In Ethical Gains, Kelley surveyed and discussed relevant court cases
regarding the regulation of work and she weaved an argument for the
constitutionality of such laws under the police power. As she articulated, liberty
of contract meant nothing to the worker who did not have bargaining power.
Engaging in a realist-type argument, Kelley posited that liberty of contract was
itself an unconstitutional form of class legislation, as it increased the power of
manufacturers and correspondingly harmed workers. She also engaged in a
critique of actual power recognizing that those industries that restricted hours of
labor generally involved male skilled workers who were voters. Often through
unions, they were able to negotiate with employers for limited hours. In contrast,
the weakest in society, those who had the least political and economic bargaining
power, such as children, poor women, and unskilled workers, were most
exploited and in need of state protection – only with state intervention could
liberty of contract have substantive meaning. Thus in Ethical Gains, Kelley
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makes a highly sophisticated argument through the interrogation of rights, power,
contract and the needs of a democratic society.
Repeatedly Kelley took some hope in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
in Holden v. Hardy (1898), which upheld a law regulating the hours of miners in
Utah. If such a dangerous occupation could be regulated, Kelley reasoned, then it
was just a matter of demonstrating that essentially all unregulated manual work
had serious health implications for the worker and the public. Thus the regulation
of hours of work could almost always be construed as a matter of health, fitting
squarely within the police power. As she argued, workers in factories were
subject to increased mechanization, which often required significantly greater
speed, taxing eyes and the physical and mental well-being of the worker.
Tenement house workers suffered from extreme fatigue, which resulted in
multiple diseases such as tuberculosis. She also ingeniously interpreted court
precedent as requiring broader rather than narrower regulation. For example, she
agreed with the New York Court of Appeals’ in re Jacobs (1885) decision, which
struck down a law prohibiting the making of cigars in tenement houses as class
legislation. Kelley explained that the law was class legislation, as it only
prohibited cigar making rather than all tenement house work. Thus the problem
with the law was that it was too narrow and the solution was legislation
prohibiting all tenement house work as a matter of public health. Furthermore, on
empirical grounds, Kelley asserted that the decision was outdated, as a great deal
more evidence existed regarding the health effects of tenement house work on
society as a whole. As she wrote, the “health of the worker is an important part of
the health of the public.”26 It was now just a matter of courts taking notice of
facts.
Again, setting the groundwork for later legal progressives, Kelley
emphasized that the question was “How can the courts be enlightened and
instructed concerning conditions as they exist? This is the burning question
which confronts both the purchasers and wage earners.”27 Part of the solution was
for courts to defer to legislatures. As she wrote, it was legislatures that had the
“apparatus for investigating the conditions of industry.”28 Thus Kelley essentially
called for a fact-based jurisprudence. Demonstrating Kelley’s understanding of
the importance of law and the courts, the appendix to Ethical Considerations is
comprised of the most important court decisions regarding worker legislation.
Where many male legal progressives primarily wrote for an audience of lawyers,
Kelley wrote for a wider audience of concerned citizens, whom she hoped to
educate and inform regarding the actions and failures of courts.

26
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In 1906, a New York appellate court ruled that a statute prohibiting
women’s night work was unconstitutional.29 In part, Kelley blamed the result on
the poor lawyering of attorneys in the New York attorney general’s office. In one
memorandum, Kelley railed that despite her efforts to make the case a priority,
the attorney for the state had not even attended the oral argument. She continued
that the brief was a “disgraceful exhibition of ignorance of the law on the
subject.”30 This memorandum is a clear reminder that Kelley was an attorney
deeply involved in legal strategy. Even more importantly, Kelley vowed that the
NCL would partake in the legal defense of challenged labor statutes and that a
prime goal of its involvement would be to force the courts to recognize the
realities of industrial work.31 As Josephine Goldmark remembered, the loss in
Williams on the ground that there was no relationship between night work and
women’s health and welfare made it clear that “The question was no longer
abstract and legal, but rather in a deep sense social and medical. It followed that
the purely legal defense of these laws was falling wide of the mark. . . . The men
upon the bench needed for their guidance the empirical testimony of the working
woman’s physician, the factory inspector, and the economist. They needed, in a
word, to know the facts.”32 Kelley and Goldmark waited for the next case.
One of the few places where it is widely acknowledged that the world of
women reformers interacted with the world of male legal progressives is the
Muller brief (1908) written by Josephine Goldmark and Louis Brandeis. It was
Kelley, with the input of Goldmark, who decided to involve Louis Brandeis.
Brandeis and Kelley in fact occupied overlapping worlds. For example, the
Brandeis’were neighbors of and close to Glendower Evans, a Boston women’s
reformer and one of Kelley’s dearest friends. Furthermore, Josephine and Pauline
Goldmark kept Brandeis abreast of the work of the National Consumers League.
Yet the Muller brief, often lauded as the first work of sociological
jurisprudence, needs to be more fully contextualized. Brandeis, as reported by
Josephine Goldmark, requested a brief filled with facts, and Goldmark, under the
supervision of Kelley, produced a prodigious amount of research on women
workers and health. Yet there is good reason to believe that Goldmark wrote the
entire brief with very little input from Brandeis.33 Furthermore, the idea of
29
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combining law and facts was clearly not new to Kelley, who had spent her life
immersed in collecting facts and using such facts to support new laws.
Importantly, the earlier brief in Ritchie (1894) had already incorporated
sociological data regarding women workers’ health and is a clear precursor to
and model for the Muller brief. This is a crucial fact that has been too often
overlooked. Moreover, in Ethical Considerations (1905), Kelley had already
recognized that the key element to convincing courts to sustain workers’
protective legislation was to educate judges with facts—a position that she had
already articulated in her 1895 criticism of Ritchie.
In 1910, Goldmark and Brandeis once again put together a fact-filled
brief, this time for the Illinois Supreme Court in Ritchie v. Wayman.34 To
Kelley’s great relief, the court upheld the law. With its victories in Muller and
Ritchie, the NCL widely distributed its briefs to college professors, lawyers,
economists, and others. State’s attorneys in Virginia, Michigan, and Louisiana
used the briefs as models in their own attempts to uphold workers’ legislation.35
In connection with the NCL’s brief in Bunting v. Oregon (1917), it raised $5,000
specifically so that four thousand copies could be distributed. Josephine
Goldmark wrote that the goal of such wide distribution was to reach those in law
schools and economic departments.36
The NCL also received a grant from the Russell Sage Foundation to
begin an intense study of workers, fatigue, and protective legislation that resulted
in Goldmark’s tome-like Fatigue and Efficiency (1912). The first part of the book
details the nature of and physiological effects of fatigue, the multiple harms that
occur from overwork, and the results from numerous studies of industrial
workers’ fatigue in specific industries. It is full of statistics, charts, and opinions
from experts. It then documents the long history of worker legislation in other
countries and more recent attempts to create labor laws in the United States. The
second part of the book is comprised of material contained in the four briefs that
Goldmark and Brandeis had submitted to various courts. In discussing how
courts used freedom of contract to strike down workers’ protective legislation,
Goldmark writes, “[S]ince employees do not stand upon an equality in bargaining
power with their employers, the so-called ‘right’ to contract for a day of any
length is purely theoretical. The worker in fact obeys the compulsion of
circumstances. . . . They have, in fact, no choice or freedom in the matter. The
alternative is to work or starve. To refuse means to be dismissed. Modern
industry has reduced ‘freedom of contract’ to a paper privilege, a mere figure of
rhetoric.”37 This absolute refutation of the meaning of freedom of contract by
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placing it into the context of the reality of workers’ lives represents the epitome
of progressive legal thought. Moreover, Goldmark wrote Fatigue in order to
provide readily usable material for lawyers and activists advocating and
defending protective labor laws. Thus the NCL, under Kelley’s leadership, must
be recognized as one of the most active, central, and consistent sites of legal
progressivism and the fight over the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
NCL’s remarkable activism continued without rupture well into the 1920s.
In the early 1920s, Molly Dewson succeeded Goldmark in preparing the
social and economic data that would go into NCL briefs. Dewson is an excellent
example of the second generation of women social scientists who were mentored,
in part, by Kelley. At the NCL, Dewson worked closely with Felix Frankfurter
and it was she who compiled the massive facts that went into the Adkins brief
while Frankfurter worked on the legal sections. While the Muller brief was
approximately 108 pages, the Adkins brief was over 1,100 pages long. The NCL
had perfected the art of the sociological brief, always believing that given enough
facts, courts would understand that workers’ protective legislation fell within the
police power. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Adkins was a devastating
blow for Kelley and instituted a serious split within the NCL, which had
participated in at least fifteen court cases regarding the constitutionality of
workers legislation since 1908. Kelley, reasonably frustrated with courts, began
advocating a constitutional amendment that would protect such legislation.
Frankfurter, Roscoe Pound, and other male lawyers opposed any such
amendment as too radical. Instead Frankfurter and his allies argued that the NCL
should continue to draft legislation around court decisions. When Kelley would
not accept such advice, the Frankfurter contingent refused to further participate in
her efforts.38 In part, this split within the NCL may hearken back to the difference
between those male legal progressives and realists who were so steeped in law
that they could not abandon the common law and traditional Constitutional
arguments, and the many women legal reformers who, from their own
experience, viewed courts, the common law, and even the Constitution as
significant obstacles to reform.39
Recognizing and incorporating women as legal reformers allows us to
reexamine, reinterpret, and expand traditional narratives of legal history. For
example, the sociological jurisprudence that Roscoe Pound called for was well
underway in the work that women reformers and others were doing. By the late
1890s, Kelley had developed a methodology that united law and facts. We can
see this in her numerous efforts to draft and lobby for new laws that drastically
expanded state power, and the ways in which she connected such laws to on-the38
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ground facts. From the mid-1890s on, she identified “liberty of contract” as an
empty phrase for workers without bargaining power, and she sought to
restructure a system of rights based upon the needs of a democratic industrial
society. She further recognized that the key to legal reform was presenting facts
of industrial life to judges. In part, we might understand the work of Brandeis,
Pound, and Frankfurter as bringing to the more conservative bar and legal
academy the legal progressivism that already existed within more radical circles
of legal reform, in which women comprised a significant component. N. E. H.
Hull writes of Pound, “As committed as he was to reform, it was a muted
commitment, muted by his legalism, by his native caution, and by his ambition
for a prize beyond the Midwest.”40 Women legal progressives such as Kelley,
who stood outside legal academia and who devoted their lives to legal reform,
functioned without such constraints, for they were already outsiders.
To acknowledge that some women must be recognized as crucial legal
actors who were at the very center of Constitutional litigation and the creation of
new understandings of the meaning of substantive due process, challenges us to
ask ourselves whom we imagine to be our historical actors and whom we are
excluding. To dismiss Kelley as a groundbreaking legal thinker and litigator
because she spent more time advocating for legal change and participating in the
everyday work of drafting, defending, and enforcing laws rather than writing for
an academic audience hampers our full understanding of legal history and the
fight against laissez faire understandings of the Constitution. As Judge Charles F.
Amidon, a federal district court judge, wrote to Kelley, “The conversations we
had together in my home while you were here have been one of the liberalizing
forces in my life. . . . During the last twelve or fifteen years of my active work on
the bench I never decided a lawsuit without immersing myself at first hand with
the life out of which it arose. You were one of the persons who got that lesson
home in my life.”41 As Frankfurter wrote of Kelley, she played, “a powerful . . .

role in securing legislation for the removal of the most glaring abuses of
our hectic industrialization following the Civil War. But we owe her an
even deeper and more enduring debt for the continuing process she so
largely helped to initiate, by which social legislation is promoted and
eventually gets on the statute books.” From Frankfurter’s words, we can
see that he recognized Kelley’s decisive role in the battle against laissezfaire. Yet this recognition has dropped out of much mainstream legal
history. Part of the future agenda for legal historians might entail writing a
narrative that would allow us to see how the work of male legal
progressives and women reformers was a joint enterprise. In doing so, the
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separate spheres of women’s activism and male legal reform may begin to
look not so separate.
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